Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott

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61. RAND Corporation, “How Terrorist Groups End: Implications for Countering al Qa’ida,” Research Brief, RB-9351-RC, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research

_briefs/RB9351/index1.html.

62. Gilles Dorronsoro, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009, http://carnegieen

dowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf.

63. Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), quoted in David Michael Smith, “The U.S. War in Afghanistan,” The Canadian, April 19, 2006, http://www.agoracosmopolitan.com/home/Frontpage/2006/04/19/01181.html, emphasis added. Cf. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 169–70.

64. Scott, The Road to 9/11, 166, 170; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 159–80. Senator Hank Brown was a supporter of the Unocal project and welcomed the fall of Kabul as a chance for stable government (Rashid, Taliban, 166).

65. Brooke Shelby Briggs, “The Taliban, Unocal and a Pipeline,” Pacific News Service, http://130.94.183.89/magazine/pipeline.html.

66. BBC, September 18, 2001.

67. Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan/Henry Holt, 2004), 176.

68. Phyllis Bennis, “Annotate This: President Obama’s Afghanistan Escalation Speech,” Institute of Policy Studies, Foreign Policy in Focus, December 2, 2009, http://www.fpif.org/articles/annotate_this_president_obamas_afghanistan_escalation_speech. Amy Goodman, summarizing an important article by Jeremy Scahill in The Nation, has reported that “Blackwater is also said to be involved in a previously undisclosed U.S. military drone campaign that has killed scores of people inside Pakistan. Blackwater operatives have been working under a covert program run by the Joint Special Operations Command, the military’s top covert operations force. The previously undisclosed JSOC operations would mark the first known confirmation of U.S. military activity inside Pakistan. A military intelligence source said Blackwater operatives are effectively running the drone bombings for both JSOC and the CIA. The CIA drone program is already public knowledge. But the military source says some of the deadliest drone attacks in attributed to the CIA were actually carried out by JSOC. The article also reveals Blackwater operatives have taken part in ground operations with Pakistani forces under a subcontract with a local security firm. The operations have included house raids and border interdictions in northwest Pakistan and other areas. Blackwater has also been given responsibility for planning JSOC operations in Uzbekistan” (Democracy Now, November 24, 2009, http://www.democracynow.org/2009/11/24/blackwaters_secret_war_in_paki

stan_jeremy).

69. Stewart, “The Irresistible Illusion.”

70. Stewart, “Afghanistan,” emphasis added.

71. Andrew Bacevich, Democracy Now, December 2, 2009, http://www.democra

cynow.org/2009/12/2/vietnam_vet_scholar_andrew_bacevichon_obama.

72. Democracy Now, December 2, 2009.

73. Andrew Bacevich, “Obama, Tell Me How This Ends,” New York Daily News, December 23, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/12/23/2009-12-23

_obama_tell_me_how_this_ends_is_afghanistan_just_a_new_war_of_attrition

.html?page=1.

74. An article in the New York Times reports a new army history of the Afghan War in support of counterinsurgency doctrine: “This year, a resurgent Taliban prompted the current American commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, to warn that the war would be lost without an infusion of additional troops and a more aggressive approach to counterinsurgency. President Obama agreed, ordering the deployment of 30,000 more troops, which will bring the total American force to 100,000” (New York Times, December 31, 2009).

75. “Deep Events and the CIA’s Global Drug Connection,” 911Truth, http://911truth.org/article.php?story=20081012142525948.

76. U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority Saff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities (November 9, 1999), http://hsgac.senate

.gov/110999_report.htm.

77. William Byrd and Christopher Ward, “Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics Policy,” Report to the World Bank, November 28, 2006, http://web

.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html.

78. Australian journalist Michael Ware, Time magazine’s correspondent in Kandahar, “Afghanistan—America’s Blind Eye,” ABC/TV (Australia), April 10, 2002, Reporter: Mark Corcoran, http://www.mickware.info/2002/files/2b3c5632e1c8fa1ad68b6f83ae91a8c3-93.php.

79. Kirk Kraeutler, “U.N. Reports That Taliban Is Stockpiling Opium,” New York Times, November 27, 2008.

80. Jeremy R. Hammond, “New York Times Misleads on Taliban Role in Opium Trade,” Foreign Policy Journal, November 29, 2008, http://www.foreignpolicyjour

nal.com/2008/11/29/new-york-times-misleads-on-taliban-role-in-opium-trade: “The Times misleads on other counts, as well. The UNODC does suggest that opium is being stockpiled as one possible explanation for why costs haven’t dropped in direct correlation with the vast over-supply. Mr. Costa has said that ‘Lack of price response in the opium market can only be the result of stock build-ups, and all evidence points to the Taliban.’ But Mr. Costa himself appears to be politicizing the report’s actual findings with this remark. The market price of opium against the estimated supply does suggest stocks are being withheld, and the Taliban does profit from the trade. But there appears to be only this circumstantial evidence that the Taliban is responsible for the theoretical stockpiling; and even if we assume that stockpiling is indeed taking place, there are also non-Taliban warlords and drug lords who may be responsible.”

81. “Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-Narcotics Policy,” Report to the World Bank, November 28, 2006, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html, emphasis added.

82. London Daily Mail, July 21, 2007.

83. Matthieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak,” Harper’s, December 2009, http://harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754.

84. Independent (London), April 13, 2006; James Nathan, “Ending the Taliban’s Money Stream: U.S. Should Buy Afghanistan’s Opium,” Washington Times, January 8, 2009.

85. Afghanistan News, December 23, 2005, http://www.afghanistannewscenter

.com/news/2005/december/dec232005.html.

86. Independent, March 9, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/former-warlord-to-fight-karzai-in-afghanistan-polls-1640164.html#mainColumn. When Obama visited Afghanistan in 2008, Gul Agha Sherzai was the first Afghan leader he met. The London Observer reported on July 21, 2002, that in order to secure his acceptance of the new Karzai government, Gul Agha Sherzai, along with other warlords, had “been ‘bought off’ with millions of dollars in deals brokered by US and British intelligence.”

87. Mark Corcoran, Australian Broadcasting Company, 2008, http://www.abc

.net.au/foreign/blog_mark.htm. “In an affidavit in his criminal case, he traced a history of cooperating with U.S. officials, including the CIA, dating to 1990. In early 2002, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Noorzai said he turned over to the U.S. military 15 truckloads of Taliban weapons, including “four hundred anti-aircraft missiles of Russian, American and British manufacture” (Tom Burghardt,